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agreement thaz has been stated on the record, whereby 
Mr, Smith would plead to first-degree murder as 
outlined on the record. 
41 I telephoned Rowena Hcskins, reviewed that 
5 with her, and she has given me authority to indicate to 
6 the Court that she is in agreement with that plea 
71 bargain and is satisfied that — on behalf of her and 
the family members — that she has told me she 
91 represents — that the — that being the wife of 
10 Mr. Bray, another sister, and a child of Mr. 3ray — 
11 that they are satisfied with a plea of guilty to this 
12 offense and a commitment of a life sentence — that 
12 they are satisfied. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. 
15 Chamberlain. 
16 MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: I'd like the record to reflect that 
18 prior to taking the bench here in the open courtroom, 
19 all counsel and I discussed this proposed plea 
^0| bargain — including Mr. Chamberlain — so that 
211 everyone was aware of what the proposal was about 
before I took the bench. 
Well, based upon the representations made, 
I'm going to find that there is a factual basis upon 
which the plea may be rested. And I'm going to also 
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THE COURT: We're back in session. It's 20 
minutes to 2:00. 
I'll first call Criminal No. 631, State cf 
Utah versus Tracy Eugene Smith. 
MR. SHUMATE: They are just removing the 
handcuffs on Mr. Smith, Your Honor, so that he can have 
the hands in front of him so he can sign this item. 
If I could approach the bench, Your Honor, 
I can give Your Honor a copy of this. We'll keep the 
original while we execute it. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
The record should reflect that Mr. Smith 
is now present with his counsel Mr. Shumate. 
This matter comes on at your request. Did 
you want to tell the Court what we're doing? 
MR. SHUMATE: Yes, Your Honor. This matter is 
before the Court for the arraignment before Your Honor 
and the entry of a plea pursuant to a .plea bargain 
agreement entered into between the defendant, myself, 
and the State of Utah, represented by Mr. Kaneli. 
The defendant is presently charged with 
first-degree murder, a capital offense. The plea 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
agreement contemplates a plea of guilty to be entered 
to that offense on a conditional basis. That is, that 
if the Court 'were to impose the sentence of death, that 
4| the conditional plea could be withdrawn. If the Court 
5 were to impose the sentence of life imprisonment, then 
6 the plea would stand. 
7| Mr. Smith and I have discussed the matter 
in substantial detail. The case has been through a 
9 preliminary hearing and, of course, was bound over for 
10 arraignment today. The Statement of Defendant 
11 Regarding Plea Bargain and certificates of counsel have 
12 been prepared. Mr. Smith has read it; has initialed 
13 it. He has not yet signed it but intends to sign it 
14 here in open court before Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. 
16 Is your full, true, and correct name Tracy 
17] Eugene Smith? 
13 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
19| THE COURT: All right. And hew old are you, 
MR. SMITH: 21. 
THE COURT: And do you read and write English? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
24| THE COURT: Have you read the Information which 
has been filed in this case against ycu? 
P D RfiTT 1 R. ** A. — C •• r?^—.—.—— TT*. / a r\ * \ *•* •* * 
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MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to go through 
that Information with you. It's relatively short. I'm 
going to read it to you now. 
State of Utah versus Tracy Eugene Smith. 
Date of birth, March 16, 1967. 
MR. SMITH: 17th. 
THE COURT: March 17, 1967. I'll make that 
amendment. 
Information in Circuit Court No. 88-CR-ll, 
District Court No. 631. 
The undersigned under oath states on 
information and belief that the above-named defendant, 
Tracy Eugene Smith, committed the following criminal 
offense, to wit: Murder in the first-degree, a capital 
offense, in violation of Section 76-5-201 and 76-5-202 
(1) (d), Utah Code Annotated as amended 1952, in that 
on or about the 3rd day of October, 1938, within Beaver 
County, State of Utah, the said defendant intentionally 
or knowingly caused the death of James Glen Bray under 
wu6 A.elbowing circumstances. 
"The homicide was committed while the 
actor was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to 
commit an aggravated robbery or robbery." In addition, 
a firearm was used in the commission or in furtherance 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
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of the -felony. 
This Information was based en evidence 
obtained from Raymond Goodwin and Sheriff Kenneth 
Yardiey. Signed by Leo G. Kane11, Beaver County 
Attorney. Authorize by presentment and filing by 
Mr. Kanell and subscribed and sworn to by me on the 6th 
day of October, 1988. 
Do you understand the Information, 
Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You have the right in 
this matter to be represented by an attorney. And you 
are represented by Mr. Shumate standing there beside 
you; is that correct? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And have you had an opportunity to 
consult with him to your satisfaction? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. You also have the right to 
require the State to prove each and every element of 
this offense beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial 
either before the Court or before a jury. 
The elements of the offense which the 
State would have to prove and which you would be 
admitting if you plead guilty in this matter ara 
PAUL G. MCMULLIIJ, CSR, RPR 
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these: That on or about the 3rd cay of October, 1D88, 
within this county and state, you intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of James Glen Bray while 
engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit 
aggravated robbery or robbery. 
Do you understand those elements? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, as I understand the law — and 
correct me if I'm wrong — the firearms enhancement 
does not apply in a capital case. 
Is that correct? There is no firearms 
enhancement? 
MR. KANELL: I'm not aware of any enhancement 
under that section. 
THE COURT: Is that correct? 
MR. SHUMATE: The Court is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So I won't explain the firearms 
enhancement. 
Do you understand all those elements that 
I just went over? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: If you admit these elements by 
pleading guilty to this offense, then the State doesn't 
have to prove them at all. You'll stand convicted by 
your own statement. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
Do you understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. If you decided to go 
forward with the trial, you would have the right at the 
trial to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against you, meaning you would have the right to hear 
them testify and ask them questions through your legal 
counsel. You would have the right not to testify or 
give evidence against yourself, meaning nobody could 
call you as a witness; nobody could make you make a 
statement. And, of course, if you plead guilty, you111 
make a statement which is the ultimate evidence against 
you. You would have also the right to present any 
evidence you wish to in that trial or to testify if you 
chose to testify. 
Do you understand all those rights? 
THE COURT: Okay. If you plead guilty, you 
waive all those rights. The trial — the trial will 
not take place, and you won't have those opportunities 
and those rights I just explained. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: You have to answer out loud. 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
THE COURT: Thank you. If this offense is 
admitted by you, it could be punishable by death, or it 
cculd be punishable by life imprisonment. 
Normally a trier — a jury would determine 
those — the sentence. You would have a right to have 
6| a jury determine which of those sentences would be 
7| imposed if you were convicted of the offense. 
Again, if you plead guilty under the 
91 conditions of this agreement, this would entail a 
10 conditional plea, meaning that you would plead guilty 
11 upon basically a commitment by the Court that a life 
12 sentence would be the punishment that would be imposed 
13 as opposed to death. And if the Court, in fact, 
14 pronounced the death sentence, you would have the right 
15 to withdraw your plea, 
16 Do you understand that? 
17 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, 
IS THE COURT: All right. Do you have any 
19 questions about the nature of the charges against you 
!0| or the possible penalties? 
*.1| MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions 
about the fact that the State has the burden of proving 
these charges? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
PAUL G. MCHULL2H. CSR, RPR 
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THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions at 
all about anything we've discussed to this point? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Has anyone brought any 
5 force or fear or threat to bear against you to cause 
6 you to enter into this agreement? 
7 MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Are you acting freely 
9 and voluntarily? 
10 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: Are you under the influence of 
12 alcohol or — 
12 MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
14 THE COURT: ~ drugs? 
15 MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Mental or physical illness? 
17 MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
18 THE COURT: So you feel like there's nothing 
19 impairing your ability to make a decision today? 
20| MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Have ycu reviewed this 
Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are these your initials that appear 
by- each paragraph? 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR. RPR 
MR. SMITH: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you signed the document? 
MR. SHUMATE: He has not, Your Honor. We intend 
to sign the document a- this point. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, having in 
mind all that we've talked about today — the possible 
penalties — and I should tell you that if you plead 
guilty under these circumstances, I most likely — most 
definitely will sentence you to serve the rest of your 
life in the Utah State Prison — having that in mind, 
is it your desire to enter into this plea agreement? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. If that's your desire, 
sign the agreement. 
(Whereupon the agreement was signed.) 
THE COURT: The record should reflect that the 
defendant has, in fact, affixed his signature in the 
presence.of the Court. 
I note in reading Paragraph 10 of the 
agreement, that it was also part of the plea agreement, 
that the State agreed not to request.the death penalty 
and net to present any aggravating evidence at a 
hearing before the Court. 
Is that correct? 
MR. KANELL: That's correct. Your Honor. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
THE COURT: Is that part of your agreement, 
Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you understand that, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
61 THE COURT: All right. Now, have we stated the 
7 entire agreement as you understand it, Mr. Smith? 
8 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: I find that the defendant is acting 
10 freely and voluntarily. He appears to be alert and 
11 responsive to the questioning of the Court. He appears 
12 to know what he' s doing and what this plea agreement is 
12 about. 
14 Do you agree, Mr. Shumate? 
15 MR. SHUMATE: Yes, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Do you agree, Mr. Smith? 
17 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
IS MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, perhaps we could make 
19 a brief record on that. 
2C| Tracy, your family has also been here this 
morning; is that correct? 
221 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
23 MR. SHUMATE: And you've had an opportunity to 
24| visit with your mother, your grandmother, your aunt, 
and your sister; is that correct? 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR. RPR 
MR- SMITH: Yes, sir. 
MR. SHUMATE: And they are here in the courtroom 
at this time? Is that also correct? 
MR. SMITH: Yes. 
MR. SHUMATE: And it's after discussing the 
matter with them and with me and with all of us 
together, that you have determined to enter into this 
decision; is that correct? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
MR. SHUMATE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all, 
Mr. Smith, about anything that is contained in this 
Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you feel you understand your 
rights in this matter? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Have I presented an adequate record, 
Mr. Shumate? Anything you can think of I need to do? 
MR. SHUMATE: Yes. I think the Court has. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kanell? 
MR. KANELL: Yes, Your Honor. I think that's 
± dkiiC • 
THE COURT: All right. Are you ready now to 
enter your plea, then, to the charge of murder in the 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
first-degree, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: What is your plea? 
MR. SMITH: Guilty. 
THE COURT: What is the factual basis? 
MR. KANELL: Your Honor, the State's case is 
that the defendant, Mr. Smith, and another companion 
that he had piciced up hitchhiking were traveling along 
1-15 in a stolen vehicle. 
As they came into Beaver County, they had 
previously used up their last money for gas for the 
vehicle, and they stopped at a rest station north of 
town there locking for someone to rob; that a truck 
driver by the name of James — excuse me. 
THE COURT: James Glen Bray. 
MR. KANELL: James Glen Bray had stopped at the 
rest stop there to — he had made a phone call. He 
went into the rest room. That the truck driver was 
observed coming into the rest room by a witness who was 
in the rest room. He left — as he was leaving the 
rest room, he observed a black male enter the rest 
room. And as he was — this witness was outside with 
his girlfriend, he was — in a short time, he heard a 
loud banging sound. He was not sure what it was, but 
the black man then came cut of the rest room, walking 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
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briskly, got into a car in the passenger's seat of the 
car, and that car drove away. This occurred shortly 
after 8:00 o'clock at night. 
It was dark. The car, as it left the rest 
area, kept its lights off until it got out onto the 
freeway, and then the lights were turned off, and the 
car sped off. 
THE COURT: Turned on, you mean? 
MR. KANELL: Turned on. That's correct, Your 
Honor. 
The witness who was there — and his 
girlfriend — drove en and contacted the sheriff's 
department and gave a description of the vehicle and of 
the black man and the white man that they had 
observed. 
The defendant and a co-defendant, 
Mr. Miller, were observed in the town of Salina and 
were stopped by officers there and questioned. The 
defendant produced a Omni weapon, which he held on his 
per 
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And that's basically the State's case, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, you've heard 
the prosecutor's statement as to what the State's case 
would sho;* in his estimation. Let me just ask you a 
couple questions to deternine whether or not there's a 
factual basis for this plea. 
Did you, in fact, shoot James Glen Bray in 
the rest stop? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And in so doing, were you trying to 
rob hin? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: What was the reason that you shot 
him? 
MR. SMITH: 
THE COURT: 
MR. SMITH: 
tell you the truth 
THE COURT: 
MR. SMITH: 
THE COURT: 
State's evidence c 
has stated it? 
MR. SHUMATE 
Do I have to — do I have to? 
Tell me what the reason was. 
It was more or less — really, to 
— a racial argument. 
A racial argument? 
Uh-huh. 
Mr. Shumate, do you agree that the 
f the robbery would be as Mr. Kanell 
Your Honor, the State's evidence 
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regarding robbery will most likely come from the 
co-defendant, Timothy Michael Miller, in Criminal 
No- 620. 
Mr. Miller was the individual driving the 
vehicle at the time. He has made statements 
implicating at least an intention to seek money at the 
rest areas by means of the gun. 
Mr. Smith and I have discussed the 
potential hazards cf taking those facts to trial, and 
he and I have both agreed that the resolution of the 
case as contemplated in the plea agreement is 
appropriate; that the hazard cf taking the facts to 
trial and resting our case solely on Mr. Smith's 
testimony is such that the plea agreement is more 
advisable. 
THE COURT: Is that right, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand what your attorney 
is saying? 
MR. SMITH: Pretty much. 
THE COURT: You understand that he's saying that 
even though.ycu disagree with the evidence about 
robbery, that he fsels and has so advised you that if 
your co-defendant testifies that you went there to rob 
somebody, that a jury might be swayed by that, and you 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
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might receive even a more severe penalty — a death 
penalty? Do you undersxand that? 
MR- SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And having that in mind, is it your 
desire to enter into a plea agreement, knowing that 
you1re going to be sentenced to prison for the rest of 
your life? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Is that a satisfactory record, 
Mr. Kanell? 
MR. KANELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, perhaps the record 
should also reflect that the impetus for the plea 
agreement is a weakness in the State's evidence in 
terms that there was no evidence and is no evidence 
that any property cr other thing of value was taken 
from the victim there at the res- area. 
THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Kanell? 
MR. KANELL: That is correct, Your Honor. That 
is a weakness in the State's case. 
THE COURT: So, in fact, there was no actual 
robbery, and your evidence would be basically 
circumstantial as to what the intent cf the defendant 
was? 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR. RPR 
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MR. KAHELL: That's correct. Your Honor. In 
fact, the Circuit Court bound over cnly on the issue of 
attempted robbery as an aggravated factor. And in the 
plea bargain, I believe it states under the factual 
basis, that it was an attempted robbery. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you understand all 
that, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about 
that? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Chamberlain, do you 
want to make a record with regard to your concerns in 
this matter? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, Your Honor. Ifd like the 
record to shew that I represent the family of the 
victim. I've been contacted by them. Specifically by 
Rcwena Hoskins, who is the sister of James Glen Bray, 
the victim in this matter.. 
I've spent a considerable amount of 
time — a considerable amount of time with the 
sheriff's office in reviewing records. I've discussed 
it with Mr. Kanell and Mr. Shumate. Because of their 
concern that justice be served, I have — shortly 
before the lunch hour, I learned of the crcocsed plea 
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agreement thaz has been stated on the record, whereby 
Mr, Smith would plead to first-degree murder as 
outlined on the record, 
I telephoned Rowena Hcskins, reviewed that 
51 with her, and she has given me authority to indicate to 
6 the Court that she is in agreement with that plea 
7 J bargain and is satisfied that — on behalf of her and 
the family members — that she has told me she 
91 represents — that the — that being the wife of 
0 Mr* Bray, another sister, and a child of Mr. 3ray — 
1 that they are satisfied with a plea of guilty to this 
2| offense and a commitment of a life sentence — that 
they are satisfied. 
41 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. 
Chamberlain. 
6J MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: I'd like the record to reflect that 
18 prior to taking the bench here in the open courtroom, 
191 all counsel and I discussed this proposed plea 
20 bargain — including Mr. Chamberlain — so that 
211 everyone was aware of what the proposal was about 
before I took the bench. 
221 Well, based upon the representations made, 
24J I'm going to find that there is a factual basis upon 
which the plaa may be rested. And I'm going to also 
PAUL G. MCMULLi::, CSR, RPR 
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find that this plea is governed by the provisions of 
the Alford .decision — Alford versus North Carolina, 
And I'm going to accept it on both of those bases, and 
I!m going zo order the plea of guilty entered. 
Recommendations regarding sentencing in 
the matter? 
MR- SHUMATE: Your Honor, Mr. Smith would ask 
the Court to allow him to waive the statutory time and 
proceed with sentencing at this time rather than to 
order the preparation of a presentence report, in view 
of the nature of the plea and the circumstances of the 
facts before the Court. 
I don't think that the Court sentencing 
alternatives are substantial at all, and we're prepared 
to go forward with that at this time. 
THE COURT: All right. Does the State have any 
objection? 
MR. KANELL: The State does not oppose that. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, just so 
you're clear on this, the law allows you two days 
before you're sentenced and up to 30 .days for 
sentencing. And you have the right to take advantage 
of that delay if you wish. 
Your counsel's indicated that you want to 
give up that right and be sentenced today; is that 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR " 
are fully contained in this Statement and in the attached plea 
agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. 
There is reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support 
the conviction of the Defendant for the offense (s) for which the 
plea(s) are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest. 
DATED this IHtk day of yy7^~»&^ 1988. 
LEO G. KANELL 
Beaver County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing 
Statement of Defendant regarding Plea Bargain and the foregoing 
Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that 
the Defendant's pleas of "guilty" to the charge(s) set forth in 
the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered. 
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before 
me this In -day of s/UG%*<>n<skc*~'f 1988. 
88cr49 
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right? 
MR, SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You realize than and 
I've already told you that if I sentence you today, 
it's going to be to the state prison for the rest of 
your life. 
Do ycu understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And having that in mind, do you 
still wish to waive your right to a delay? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect 
that waiver. 
Does either counsel wish to present 
anything before I impose sentence? 
Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith, do you wish to make a 
statement in your own behalf before I impose sentence? 
MR. SMITH: I'm sorry for what happened. I 
wish, you know, if he cculd feel my apology. I know 
that it can't bring him back, but I didn't mean to do 
it. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SMITH: That's it. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
P. 0 . S e x 1524 - S t . G e c r g s , U t . (SOI) 6 7 3 - 5 3 1 5 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for TRACY EUGENE 
SMITH, the Defendant above-named, and I know the Defendant has 
read the Affidavit or that I have read it to the Defendant; I 
have discussed it with the Defendant and believe that the 
Defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the 
foregoing Statement are, in all respects, accurate and true. 
DATED this /'C/ day of fytutv^h*** / 1988. 
HUMATE* 
ttorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE 0F./PR0SECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah 
in its case against TRACY EUGENE SMITH, Defendant. I have 
reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the 
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct. 
No improper inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a 
plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations 
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THE COURT: Mr. Kane11, anything? 
MR-. XANELL: Your Honor, pursuant to the plea 
agreement, the State does not have any evidence of 
aggravating circumstances to present, and the State 
does not request the Court to sentence the defendant to 
the death sentence. 
THE COURT: Does not request that? 
MR. XANELL: Does not request that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. XANELL: The State requests the Court to 
sentence the defendant to life in prison. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SHUMATE: I111 submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Tracy Eugene Smith, 
having been convicted by your own plea of the offense 
of murder in the first-degree, a capital offense, in 
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, I now 
sentence you to the Utah State Prison for the rest of 
your natural life. 
I'm also going to make a recommendation to 
the board of pardons, which I would like included in 
the order, that Mr. Smith serve 20 years before he's 
considered to be released from the Utah State Prison. 
Anything else? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court 
and may or may not be approved or followed by the Court. 
11. I am not now under the influence of either drugs 
or alcohol. 
s^f^S 12. I have read this Statement or I have had it read 
to me by my attorney and I have placed my initials beside each 
paragraph to indicated that I know and understand its contents. 
I am Jj,/ years of age, have attended school through 
the iJ2— and I can read and understand the 
English Language. I have discussed its contents with my attorney 
and I ask the Court to accept my plea of guilty to the charges 
set forth above in this statement because I did, in fact, 
(1) on the 3rd day of October, 1988, intentionally and 
knowlingly c a u s ^ the death of JAMES GLEN BRAY, while 
engaged in the commission of an attempted, aggravated 
robbery; 
(2) That I did so within Beaver County, State of 
Utah. 
DATED 
:an. 
this
 mJj£_~&*y of //oiye^i^ kt^ 1988. 
2UGENI TRACY EU E SMITH 
Defendant 
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THE COURT: Mr. Kanell, will you prepare the 
comnxitnient papers and the judgment? 
MR. KANELL; Would you like -- would it be 
appropriate to indicate in the order that a firearm was 
used in the commission of the offense? 
6| THE COURT: Well, there hasn't been a plea taken 
7 to that, but I think the factual basis, as we stated 
8 it, is clear. 
9 Perhaps what I would prefer you do is 
10 obtain a copy cf the transcript of today's proceedings, 
11 and you may attach that, if you wish, when we send it 
12 up to the board of pardons. 
12 MR, KANELL: Okay, Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Anything else to be 
15 taken care of? 
16 MR, SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. Good luck, Mr. Smith. 
IS I need to inform you cf one other matter, 
19 Mr. Smith. You have the right to appeal the decisions 
4.01 o*. v»rii3 Ccur«. wC^ny. Tna*. r^ gn*. v»c appea.*. ceg^ns to 
21J run today. If you want to appeal, you have to file 
notice of your intent to appeal with the clerk within 
20 days of today's date. If you fail to do that, you 
24j lose your right to appeal. 
Do you understand your right to appeal? 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
P. 0. Box 1524 - St. George, Ut. (801) 672-5215 
which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences 
beTng imposed on me. 
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of 
guilty does not mean that the Court will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been 
made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead 
guilty or that it will be made lighter because of my guilty plea. 
9. No one has forced or threatened or coerced me to 
obtain my plea of guilty and I am doing so of my own free will 
and after discussing it with my attorney. I know that any 
opinions he may have expressed to me as to what he believes the 
Court may do are not binding upon the Court. 
sip 10. No promises of any kind have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty except that I have been told that if I do 
>^is> plead guilty, the State has agreed to not request the death 
* ^  penalty and to not present any aggravating evidence at the 
hearing before the court. I have also been informed that my plea 
of guilty to the offense of FIRST DEGREE MURDER, a capital 
offense, is conditional upon the court's imposition of a sentence 
of life imprisonment. I understand that should the court impose 
the death penalty, I may withdraw my plea of guilty and require 
the State of Utah to go forward with a trial in the matter. I am 
also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a 
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* * I 
IS 
10 
20 
21 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Good luck. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the 
ibcve-entitled matter were concluded.) 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR, RPR 
rk^> 4. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of 
the United States I have a right against self-incrimination or a 
right- not to give evidence against myself and that this means 
that I cannot be compelled to testify in Court upon trial unless 
I choose to do so. 
A O 5. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Court, I would have 
a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to either the Court 
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for 
such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State without cost 
to me and that I would have the right to have the assistance of 
counsel on such appeal. 
fiS^ 6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of 
guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights as set out in the 
five preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully 
incriminating myself by admitting that I am guilty of the crimes 
to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
. H ^ 7. I know that under the laws of Utah the maximum 
sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to 
the charges identified on page one of this affidavit is: 
A. Death or life imprisonment, 
and that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my 
plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of 
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II C E R T I F I C A T E 
21 STATE OF UTAH ) 
) S3 • 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
41 I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Notary 
5 Public, in and for the County of Washington, State of 
6 Utah, do hereby certify: 
7J That, the foregoing matter, to wit, 
STATE OF UTAH VS. TRACY EUGENE SMITH, CRIMINAL NO. 621, 
Ol was taken down by ma in shorthand at the time and place 
10 therein named and thereafter reduced to computerized 
11 transcription under my direction. 
12 I further testify that I am not interested 
12 in the event of the action. 
14 WITNESS my hand and seal this 22rd day of 
15 J December, 198S. 
16 
17 
18 
191 PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
2CI 
21 RESIDING AT: S t . George , Utah 
< > 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-91 'A *•> — 
\ % -
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
P. C. Bo:s 1524 - St. Gecrge, Ut. (SOI) 672-5215 
1. I know that I have constitutional rights under the 
Constitutions of Utah and the United States to plead not guilty 
and to have a jury trial upon the charges to which I have entered 
a plea of guilty or to a trial by the Court should I elect to 
waive a trial by jury. I know that I have a right to be 
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by JAMES 
L. SHUMATE as my attorney. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial upon the 
charges, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against 
me by having them testify, in open court, in my presence and 
before the Court and jury and that I have the right to have those 
witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have 
the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State, at its 
expense, to testify in Court upon my behalf and that I could, if 
I elected to do so, testify in Court upon my own behalf and that, 
if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this 
fact may not be held against me if I choose to have the jury so 
instructed. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial, the State 
must prove each and every element of the crime charged to the 
satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that 
I would have no obligation to offer any evidence myself and that 
any verdict rendered by a jury, whether it be that of guilty or 
not guilty, must be by unanimous agreement of all jurors. 
-2-
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LEO G. KANELL 
Beaver County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 471 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Telephone: 438-2351 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN, 
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL, 
AND ORDER 
Criminal No. 631 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA AGREEMENT 
I, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, the above-named Defendant, under 
oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of guilty to 
the charge of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a capital offense, as 
contained in the Information on file against me in the 
above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have received, and I 
understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is 
a capital felony and that I am entering such plea voluntarily and 
of my own free will after conferring with my attorney, JAMES L. 
SHUMATE, and with the knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
W 
CRAIG S. COOK, No. 713 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: 48 5-8123 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
Petitioner, TO RESPONDENTS1 MOTION 
TO DISMISS HABEAS PETITIC 
vs • 
HANK GALETKA, North Point Warden, No. 920553 
UTAH STATE PRISON and THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
This Memorandum is written in opposition to Respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on 
December 18, 1992. 
The State has distorted the factual record in this case as 
well as applicable case law, and has failed to correctly analyze 
the facts and legal principles as they apply to this case. For 
these reasons, therefore, Petitioner is compelled to respond to 
its Memorandum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State attempts to argue that Petitioner in December of 
1988 had the opportunity of filing a direct appeal in this matter 
and did not do so. The State has left out, however, several 
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important facts. For example, the State makes the following 
quotation: 
Petitioner therein stated that he had been 
assured by his attorney Hthat a timely notice of 
appeal would be filed with this Court, base[d] upon 
but not limited to effective assistance of counsel." 
(R. 69). (Respondent's Memorandum, at 2). 
Respondents conveniently left out the last sentence that 
Petitioner wrote following that quoted by the respondents. It 
stated, MThat counsel did not fully investigate the facts of the 
case at bar that could have proven the defendant's innocence." 
(R. 69). Thus, contrary to the State's repeated assertions, any 
mention of ineffective counsel in this prior motion had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the proceedings of the guilty plea but 
instead concerned a claim that counsel failed to investigate the 
facts of the killing. 
A second serious omission concerns the facts and 
circumstances relating to the "notice of belated appeal." On 
January 27, 1989 the Clerk of this Court sent a notice to the 
Beaver County Clerk that a notice of appeal had been filed in 
Case No. 890027 (R. 74). On March 20, 1989 a hearing was held 
before the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Defendant was once again 
represented by his court-appointed attorney, James L. Shumate. 
If the question of this appeal becomes relevant, Petitioner would 
proffer that in his conversations with Mr. Shumate he was 
informed that he could not raise any claim of ineffectiveness of 
counsel on appeal and that therefore he should go into the 
Federal court and file a habeas corpus action if he was unhappy 
with Mr. Shumate's performance concerning the investigation. The 
-2-
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A life sentence for capital murder is an indeterminate sentence modifiable by the 
Board of Pardons. Otherwise the Court's recommendation of 20 years before parole would 
be irrelevant and meaningless and this Motion would never have been made. It is evident 
that the Utah Legislature considers a life sentence for capital murder as an indeterminate 
sentence, since it has enacted, since the sentencing in this case, a new possible sentence in 
such cases, life without possibility of parole. (See 76-3-201 UCA) 
The defendant's Motion is denied. The sentence in his case was not illegal as he 
complains. 
DATED this P "~day of July 1996. ^ * » » > ^ 
Minute Entry substantiates Petitioner's claim by the following 
statement: 
This matter was called on for hearing at the 
request of the defendant. Mr. Shumate informed and 
the defendant concurred that the motion be voluntarily 
withdrawn. Mr. Shumate stated that the defendant will 
pursue his requested relief in the Federal court 
system. The appeal was ordered withdrawn. (R. 86). 
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed on December 
4, 1991 by the petitioner pro se. His sole grounds for the 
petition was that there was insufficient evidence to charge him 
with first degree murder. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS PETITION IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
SINCE PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE BROUGHT 
HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM IN HIS 
PRIOR MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
The State argues that since Petitioner did not raise the 
ineffectiveness of counsel in his motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea he is now barred from raising it in this habeas corpus 
action. The State cites the case of Garrish v. Barnes as 
standing for the proposition "a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
is a prior post-conviction proceeding for procedural bar 
purposes." Again, the State completely distorts the status of 
Utah law. In Garrish this Court held that Garrish was 
procedurally barred by failing to raise the issue of the breached 
plea bargain on appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea. This Court did not hold that the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea precluded a subsequent habeas corpus 
action. 
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the position, citing no authority supporting his view, that a life sentence is not an 
indeterminate sentence. 
The Court now holds that the position of the defendant is incorrect under the Utah 
sentencing scheme. In fact a life sentence for Murder, a capital felony, is an indeterminate 
sentence. Therefore the sentence is not illegal. 
Under Utah's sentencing scheme, all commitments to prison are considered 
indeterminate sentences unless otherwise provided by law. (77-18-4 UCA) Utah's 
Constitution and statutes provide for a Board of Pardons which body is charged with the 
authority and responsibility of determining whether a sentence will be fully served, modified, 
or terminated. (See 77-27-5 UCA; Andrus v. Turner. 590 P.2d 363; Raslins v. Holden. 869 
P-2d 958.) 
The Board of Pardons has unfettered discretion in carrying out its function and its 
decisions are not subject to judicial scrutiny, except in limited cases. 
An indeterminate sentence is one fixed by the sentencing authority (the Court) as a 
maximum sentence or within a possible minimum/maximum range, understanding that the 
actual time to be serve will be later determined by another entity, the Board of Pardons.1 
The alternative plan, determinate sentencing, is used in some states and jurisdictions. Under 
determinate sentencing the Court fixes the exact number of years, months or days to be 
served by the defendant and no other entity has authority to require more or less, as long as 
the sentence is legally permissible. This is not Utah's approach to sentencing. 
'See Mutart v. Pratt. 170 P.67; State v. Empev. 239 P.25; Lee Lim v. Davis, 284 
P.232. 
Counsel has read the Garrish case several times and has been 
unable to find anywhere in the opinion that a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is considered a prior post-conviction proceeding in 
relation to habeas corpus petitions. Rule 20, for example, of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure only requests a "statement 
indicating whether any other petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
based upon the same or similar grounds has been filed and the 
reason why relief was denied. (Rule 20(c)(3)), 
The issues in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a 
habeas corpus action can be quite distinct. In the motion to 
withdraw action, the question is whether the defendant made a 
knowing plea or whether the State and the Court breached its 
agreement with the defendant. In many cases involving guilty 
plea motions no claim whatsoever is made of ineffectiveness of 
counsel. Likewise, a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel in a 
habeas corpus action may have nothing whatsoever to do with the 
entry of the guilty plea. It is for this reason that two 
post-conviction remedies cannot be used as procedural bars in the 
sense of two successive petitions for habeas corpus. 
The distinction in Garrish and the instant case is 
remarkable. Garrish was convicted of child abuse and was 
ultimately sentenced to a minimum mandatory term of six years to 
life. During the proceedings he was represented by three 
separate attorneys. Here, Petitioner, who was 21 years old at 
the time of the conviction, was represented by only one attorney 
and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-year 
recommendation of imprisonment. This recommendation is now being 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, j MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Plaintiff, j 
vs. I CASE NO. 631 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, \ 
I I I 
Defendant. ! 
i 
i 
i 
_ — i 
The defendant, Tracy Eugene Smith, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Murder 
in the First Degree, a capital felony, on November 14, 1988. The Court sentenced him to 
serve a life sentence and recommended to the Board of Pardons that he serve at least 20 
years before being allowed parole. The defendant has since filed at least one appeal and 
several petitions for extraordinary relief. 
On May 15, 1996, the defendant caused to be filed a "Motion for an Order of Court 
Correcting a Sentence that was Imposed in an Illegal Manner." The defendant moves the 
Court to correct or modify the sentence given by deleting the Court's recommendation'that 
the defendant serve 20 years before being paroled. The defendant correctly argues that the 
Court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. (See Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.) 
The alleged illegality raised by the defendant is that the Court sentenced the defendant 
to a life sentence and then made a recommendation pursuant to 77-27-13(5) UCA. The 
defendant argues that the Court acted illegally because that statutory provision, by its own 
terms, applies only to cases where an "indeterminate sentence is imposed," Defendant takes 
followed by the Board of Pardons. 
Garrish involved (1) a direct appeal, (2) a full evidentiary 
hearing as to a subsequent motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
(3) an appeal from that denial; (4) three separate habeas corpus 
actions; and (5) an appeal from the denial of t:he third habeas 
corpus petition. In contrast to this abundance of judicial 
procedure in Garrish, the petitioner in this case did not file 
any direct appeal from his entry of guilty plea based upon the 
advice of his court-appointed attorney, James Shumate. Appearing 
pro se, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea but 
no evidentiary hearing was held. The Court ordered the dismissal 
of the motion based solely upon the record. It was not until the 
proceedings before this Court with Petitioner's new 
court-appointed attorney that the present claims in the direct 
appeal and habeas corpus action have been made. This blemished 
legal process supports the contention of Justice Zimmerman in 
Garrish that counsel should be provided in a thorough post 
conviction proceeding and appeal. 
Clearly, Petitioner was not previously aware of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel in sentencing now being asserted in 
the habeas corpus action filed in this court. The State's 
repeated reference that he was aware of such a claim four years 
earlier is a complete distortion of the record. (Respondents1 
Brief at 4). His earlier statement in his affidavit concerning 
his counsel's failure to investigate the facts of the crime 
certainly does not preclude an ineffectiveness claim being made 
as to his counsel's performance during the guilty plea proceeding 
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itself. 
In failing to file a direct appeal, Petitioner cannot be 
held accountable for listening to the advice of the 
court-appointed attorney who is now being accused of being 
ineffective. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989). In 
addition, this Court has held that the writ of habeas corpus is a 
flexible protection to protect against the denial of a 
constitutional right in a criminal conviction and that the "good 
cause" requirement is justified for a number of reasons including 
the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction* Hearst 
v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989). 
Accordingly, this petition is not procedurally barred and 
must not be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THIS PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 
UNDER HILL V. LOCKHART. 
The State next argues that under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52 (1985) Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient prejudice to 
allow this matter to proceed. This claim is broken by the State 
into two parts: first, the assertion by Petitioner that his 
counsel failed to inform him as to the twenty-year sentence 
recommendation or that the judge could make such a 
recommendation; and second, the other matters concerning 
counsel's representation during the guilty plea proceeding. 
These parts will now be addressed sequentially. 
The Hill v. Lockhart case, contrary to the State's 
assertion, is not identical "in all material respects to the case 
at bar." In Hill the petitioner claimed his attorney failed to 
-6-
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Defendant has had repeated opportunities to raise this issue, including a prior motion to 
withdraw his plea. There is no new evidence alleged by defendant. The limitations period for 
post-conviction relief has passed. (See 78-35a-107 UCA) 
Pursuant to Rule 65B(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this court now finds that this 
motion is frivolous, repetitive and without merit. In addition, it is unsupported by the records 
of the plea. 
Accordingly for the reasons set out above, the Motion is denied. 
DATED this 21st day of August 1997. 
properly advise him as to his eligibility for parole under the 
sentence agreed to in the plea bargain. The Supreme Court held 
that neither Arkansas nor Federal law required that petitioner be 
informed of his parole eligibility date prior to pleading guilty. 
The Court stated: 
We have never held that the United States 
Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant 
with information about parole eligibility in order for 
the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary, and 
indeed such a constitutional requirement would be 
inconsistent with the current rules of procedure 
governing the entry of guilty pleas in the Federal 
court- 474 U.S. at 56. 
In the instant case, the information which was omitted by 
Petitioner's counsel was not that of parole but was that of 
sentencing. Numerous cases hold that matters affecting the 
sentence of a defendant allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if all 
elements and facts and circumstances are not fully explained. 
See State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929 (Utah 1989); State v, Copeland, 
765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 
1988); State v. Vasilacopulous, 756 P,2d 92 (Utah App. 
1988). 
Once again, the State has distorted the record by failing to 
complete the quotation cited in Respondents' memorandum. The 
State makes the following assertion: 
In his affidavit he states under oath, "Had I 
known that the judge was going to make this kind of 
recommendation I don't know whether I would have 
entered this plea or not... (Respondents' Memorandum 
at 7) . 
The State omitted the following subsequent language of that 
sentence, "since the state had very weak evidence concerning the 
attempt to rob Mr. Bray." (Affidavit at 18). 
-7-
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Section 78-35a-109 UCA requires the court to consider two factors in deciding whether 
to appoint pro bono counsel. The court has considered those factors. This case raises only 
one issue, ie: whether the defendant can withdraw his plea of guilty. Defendant alleges that 
this court failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 11, U.R.Crim.P. There is no need for 
an evidentiary hearing as the issues can be decided from the transcripts and records of the 
taking of the plea. In addition, in view of the provisions of 78-35a-106 UCA and 78-35a-107 
UCA, this court will be dismissing and denying the Motion because the Statute of Limitations 
period has passed and the claim raised by the defendant in this motion was raised and 
addressed in previous appeal proceedings, or should have been, or was raised and addressed in 
previous post conviction relief proceedings, or should have been. 
The issues do not appear complicated and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. 
Thus the appointment of pro bono counsel is not warranted. 
The petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Legal Counsel is denied. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
On August 4, 1997, Mr. Smith filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for 
Hearing on his most recent motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The Court declines to set the 
matter for oral argument. The Court has read the Motion submitted by Mr. Smith and the 
affidavits included herewith. Mr. Smith challenges the entry of the plea in this case on the 
grounds that he was not advised that the recommendations of the prosecution and his own 
attorney were not binding upon the Court. 
The Lockhart case acknowledged that in many instances an 
inquiry of "prejudice" will depend on likelihoods of various 
circumstances and how they would have most probably affected the 
outcome of a trial or plea. Petitioner was entitled to be 
informed of all available pertinent information concerning 
sentencing. By not being given this information he was clearly 
prejudiced as a matter of law by being unable to make a knowing 
and voluntary decision. If he stated today that he would not 
have entered the plea had he known this twenty-year 
recommendation would be made, such a statement would be 
meaningless since the inquiry in these type of cases is at the 
time the guilty plea was made. The failure to correctly advise a 
defendant as to pertinent sentencing information creates 
automatic prejudice regardless of what outcome a defendant may 
have chosen had he been correctly advised. 
The second portion of the argument made by the State is 
equally absurd. The State claims that the petition never alleges 
that but for counsel's errors the judge would have made a 
different recommendation or no recommendation at all. 
(Respondents' Brief at 8). This statement is simply not true. 
As noted in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities which was 
incorporated by reference in the habeas corpus petition, "had 
Petitioner's appointed counsel been effective the twenty-year 
recommendation made by the lower court at the conclusion of the 
sentencing proceeding may well not have been made." (Petitioner's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 2). Moreover, Petitioner 
devoted seven pages of his Memorandum to showing the prejudice 
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determination was appealed. On April 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum 
Opinion upholding the decision of the trial court. 
In addition Mr. Smith filed in the 3rd-District Court the case of Smith v. Galetka. Case 
No. 930900217, which was a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that case Mr. Smith 
raised additional claims as to the propriety of the taking of his plea. The trial court ruled 
against Mr. Smith in that case, and Mr. Smith did not appeal. 
MOTION TO APPOINT LEGAL COUNSEL 
On July 28, 1997, Mr. Smith filed yet another Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
Correct Illegal Sentence. He now seeks to have this Court appoint counsel to represent him 
and proposes to require the County of Beaver to pay the costs of that Motion and the 
subsequent proceedings. 
Under the provisions of 78-35a-101 UCA, et. Seq.. the Court has authority only to 
appoint pro bono counsel. There is no provision for appointments paid by the county where 
the conviction occurred. 
This Court apparently has discretion as to whether or not to appoint counsel. (See 78-
35a-109 UCA) Although this is a serious case for the petitioner in view of the long period of 
confinement which he is undergoing, the Court is of the opinion that Mr. Smith has had 
several opportunities to raise the issues which he thought were appropriate relating to his entry 
of his plea of guilty in this case. The Court can see no reason to appoint counsel in this case 
and hereby declines to do so. 
which occurred or could have occurred because of counsel's 
conduct during the sentencing proceedings. See Petitioner's 
Memorandum at 10-16. 
The State wishes Petitioner to be a fortune teller. The 
State wishes Petitioner to allege what the judge woud have done 
had Petitioner's attorney presented the information to him as he 
should have done under an effective counsel standard. Petitioner 
submits that there is a reasonable probability that the conduct 
of his counsel undermined the confidence in the outcome of the 
sentencing recommendation. Again, Petitioner was entitled to 
present reliable information to the court as part of his 
constitutional sentencing rights. Whether the judge would have 
done anything differently after this material had been presented 
is not the question. It is the failure to present this material 
which is the crux of this petition. In the context of a trial 
setting, it cannot be said that the complete failure of Mr. 
Shumate to present any evidence or arguments in the sentencing 
hearing was "harmless error." 
The State also wishes Petitioner to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the twenty-year recommendation made by the 
court conclusively caused the twenty-year sentence imposed by the 
Board of Pardons. This kind of proof is not required here. The 
mere coincidence of the twenty-year term in both proceedings 
establishes a "reasonable probability" that the judge's 
recommendation was followed by the Board of Pardons. 
The State, in summary, is attempting to use technicalities 
to escape a clear case of possible injustice. If it is necessary 
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This matter came before the Court this date on the petitioner's Motion and Order for 
Appointment of Legal Counsel. The petitioner moves the Court for appointment of legal 
counsel to be paid by Beaver County and to pursue petitioner's most recent motion to 
withdraw his plea. 
The defendant was convicted of murder upon his plea of guilty on November 14, 1988. 
Thereafter in December 1991, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after 
having lost his direct appeal rights by inaction. The Court denied the request to withdraw the 
guilty plea and the matter was pursued by appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
On December 27, 1993, the Supreme Court issued its opinion addressing the claims raised by 
the defendant, including the letter written by this Court to the Board of Pardons recommending 
that the defendant serve at least 20 years. The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw 
the plea was upheld. Thereafter the defendant herein filed a motion for an order of the Court 
correcting the sentence which Mr. Smith claimed was illegal. The Court issued a 
Memorandum Opinion on July 19, 1996, in which the defendant's motion was denied. That 
to weigh probabilities and "what ifs" then an evidentiary hearing 
should be held so that factual findings can be made concerning 
these predictions and probability assessments. Petitioner would 
assert, however, that the record on its face clearly shows that 
he was denied effective representation of counsel by the complete 
failure to meet the standards of an attorney representing a 
defendant in a capital murder case in which a substantial 
sentence is extremely possible. 
For these reasons, therefore, this matter should be set for 
hearing either on the merits or remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing to answer any of the questions that are pertinent to this 
petition. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 1992. 
Craig S. C6ok 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
this 28th day of December, 1992. 
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SUBJECT 
Id., quoting Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989). This Court finds that the 
present motion merely recited those arguments made by Defendant on other occasions, and 
represents an attempt to keep his case alive indefinitely. As such, it was within this Court's 
discretion to dismiss the present motion without including findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. 
14. Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion of Reconsideration of Defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence is DENIED. 
Dated at Parowan, Utah this Z day of September, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
g<f^ys^L 
GE J.IPHIL^EVES 
s. 
January 13, 1994 
Honorable David S. Young 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Tracy Eugene Smith v. Hank Galetka, et al. 
Case No. 93-0900217HC 
Dear Judge Young: 
I have recently completed an extensive review of this case 
together with the decision rendered last month by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, because of various procedural 
difficulties which have occurred in this case, I am at a loss as 
to how to proceed. For this reason, I would request a conference 
with counsel in order to have the opportunity to determine how to 
proceed in the future. 
In order to allow the Court and counsel an insight into my 
concerns I offer the following. At the conclusion of the hearing 
in this case you ordered that Ms. Micklos prepare Findings in 
support of your judgment. I was to be sent the Findings for my 
approval as to form. Accordingly, Ms. Micklos sent me her 
proposed Findings and in order to try to expedite this case I 
sent to her my proposed changes to her Findings and Conclusions 
on November 3, 1993. On November 9 she sent me a letter stating 
she could not accept these changes and that the Findings would 
therefore be submitted to. 
I assumed that my objections were also included with her 
Findings but I do not know if they were or not. In any event, on 
November 22 the Court executed the Findings and Judgment. On 
November 29 I sent this Court a letter stating that I was not 
sure if my objections had been received and therefore enclosed a 
copy of my objections for consideration. At that time I did not 
know that the Court had already executed the Findings and Order. 
On December 14 this Court issued a Minute Entry declining to 
sing the requested Findings offered by me but finding that the 
Court disagreed with portions of two of the findings and 
10. The burden of satisfying the first prong weighs heavily against the Defendant. 
"To prevail on the first prong, a petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance." IcL (citations omitted). This requires the Defendant to 
demonstrate specific instances where counsel acted or failed to act in a manner which does 
not meet an objective standard of reasonableness. M- (citations omitted). Importantly, courts 
reviewing an attorney's performance will grant "counsel wide latitude to make tactical 
decisions and will not question such decisions unless . . . [there is] fno reasonable basis1 for 
them." Id., quoting Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993). 
11. In the present case, defense counsel addressed the Court with regard to the 
weaknesses in the State's case against the Defendant. At that time, defense counsel stated 
that, in light of the fact that Defendant's co-defendant was involved in a criminal case arising 
out of the same incident, and that testimony might be elicited in that case which would 
implicate the Defendant in a robbery offense, it was advisable for the Defendant to accept the 
terms of the plea. When taking the co-defendant's criminal case into consideration, and the 
possibility that Defendant faced a death sentence if his case had resulted in a jury trial, it is 
the opinion of this Court that defense counsel's advice that Defendant sign the plea agreement 
had a reasonable basis which does not reflect ineffective assistance of counsel. 
12. As this Court has determined Defendant failed to satisfy the first prong required 
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it will not reach the issue of whether Defendant 
satisfied the second prong. Therefore, this Court finds that the Defendant has failed to set 
forth any new facts or present any other reason which would warrant providing relief from 
this Court's August 21, 1997 decision. 
13. In conclusion, this Court would direct Defendant's attention to the Court's 
finding in the August 21, 1997 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, wherein the Court 
determined that Defendant's motion was frivolous, repetitive and without merit pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. 65(B)(5). This Court would also direct Defendant's attention to the case Wright v. 
Carver. 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994), which held: 
"A ground for relief from a conviction or sentence that has once been fully and 
fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas proceeding should not be 
readjudicated unless it can be shown that there are 'unusual circumstances.' . . .This 
rule was fashioned to prevent abuse by prisoners who burden the courts and 
frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep cases alive indefinitely.'" 
conclusions which had in fact been executed. The Court stated, 
"The Findings entered may remain with these adjustments." 
On December 27, 1993 the Supreme Court in Case No. 92-0141 
affirmed the lower court's denial of Mr. Smith's Motion to 
Withdraw his guilty plea and discussed the issue that was raised 
for the first time on appeal concerning Appellant's claim that 
tftzr lower court had insufficient evidence in order to make a 
twenty year recommendation of a sentence. Because this issue was 
raised for the first time on appeal, the Supreme Court refused to 
hear it. The Court stated, "However, the District Court may 
address the issue of the twenty-year recommendation in Smith's 
pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." 
These procedural events, as seems to be typical of this 
case, cannot be readily classified under our rules of civil 
procedure. I view them as follows: The state submitted proposed 
Findings to the Court which had not been approved as to form by 
myself. Through a misunderstanding I assumed that my objections 
had been filed concurrently but apparently they were not. This 
Court, based upon no objections,, entered the Findings on November 
22. 
No official notice was sent to me that the Judgment had been 
entered in accordance with Rule 58A(d). Nevertheless, I sent to 
this Court my proposed changes and additions to the Findings 
submitted by the State. This letter and proposed Findings was 
essentially a motion under Rule 52 or Rule 59 requesting an 
amendment of the Findings and Judgment. 
The Minute Entry of December 14, in my view, was therefore a 
decision denying the requested changes except for two specific 
Findings. The Minute Entry, however, is not a final order for 
any purpose and thus an order needs to be prepared officially 
amending the previously-entered Findings. 
Since a final judgment has not been entered in this case 
Rule 59 would allow Petitioner to file a Motion to Open the 
Judgment to take additional evidence, if necessary, as to the 
issue that has been referred to this Court by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
After this Court enters a decision as to the "judge's 
recommendation issue", then the entire matter could be finalized 
if an order which then could be appealable to the Supreme Court 
in Petitioner desires. 
While I acknowledge that this above scenario is open to 
debate, I believe that this is the precise reason that a 
conference should be held in order to discuss the most prudent 
way of proceeding to avoid any further road blocks to completing 
this case. I would be most happy to schedule a conference with 
the Court and with Ms. Micklos at any time during the next four 
weeks. 
the purpose behind this rule is to ensure defendants are guaranteed their constitutional rights. 
7. However, this Court would also point out that the provision at issue affords 
protection only if sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court. In the case at hand, 
the Defendant was charged with a capital offense, the criminal penalties for which are 
statutorily designated as either the death penalty or life imprisonment. U.C.A. § 76-3-207(4), 
(6) (1996). In addition, the parties had entered into a conditional plea agreement which 
expressly provided that Defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than face 
the potentiality of a death sentence in a trial by jury. Therefore, according to the statute, and 
the plea arrangement agreed to by the parties, the term of Defendant's sentence was not an 
issue at the time of sentencing. 
8. At the time the Defendant entered his plea, this Court asked counsel if they had 
any recommendations regarding sentencing. This question, taken out of context, may be what 
has confused the Defendant and led him to believe that some violation of his Rule 11 rights 
was violated. However, when taken in context, the question was asked and responded to in 
light of Defendant's right to delay the imposition of sentencing for a period of thirty days. 
Counsel for the Defendant responded by saying that the Defendant desired to waive that time, 
and that a presentence report was unnecessary in light of the nature of the plea. Therefore, 
this Court does not find merit in Defendant's claim that the Court erred by violating 
Defendant's Rule 11 protections. 
9. With respect to Defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at the time he entered his plea, this Court agrees with Defendant's interpretation of 
U.C.A. § 78-35a-106(2), insofar as the statute permits individuals challenging a conviction or 
sentence to seek relief on grounds they received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that this 
claim is exempt from the statute of limitations period governing appeals. However,! this 
Court would add that, in order to establish that he was poorly represented, the Defendant 
must satisfy a two-prong test: 
First, a petitioner must show "that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment." . . .Second, a petition must show that his 
counsel's performance prejudiced him. 
Tavlor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995); quoting Bundv v. Deland. 763 P.2d 803, 
805 (Utah 1988). 
I appreciate your attention in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Craig S. Cook 
CSCrkd 
cc: Angela F. Miklos 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
not timely, in that the applicable statute of limitations period had expired for bringing forward 
such motions. (Id. at p. 3) 
3. Defendant claimed he was not advised that the recommendations made by the 
prosecutor and defense counsel were not binding on the Court, and that such knowledge 
would have altered the outcome. This Court declined to grant Defendant's motion on this 
claim on grounds that the Defendant failed to present new evidence, and that the statute of 
limitations period had expired for that relief as well. (Id. at pp. 3-4) 
4. Defendant's present motion requests a reconsideration of that prior order. 
The Defendant primarily focuses on two different claims. First, the Defendant claims that he 
was inadequately represented by counsel at the time the plea agreement was entered on the 
record, in that the State would be unable to establish that Defendant had the requisite intent to 
commit the crime in a trial on the matter, which defense counsel failed to properly consider. 
Second, the Defendant claims that this Court committed error in failing to advise the 
Defendant that any sentencing recommendations agreed upon by the prosecution and defense 
counsel were not binding on the Court. 
5. As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that the rules of civil procedure do not 
include a provision for motions for reconsideration. See Ron Shepherd Ins.. Inc. v. Shields. 
882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994). However, it has been the practice of some courts to address 
motions which have been so titled as if they had been filed pursuant to an applicable rule. See 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). This Court finds that 
Defendant's motion finds some applicability with Rule 60 of the rules of civil procedure, 
which provides for relief from a judgment or order. A motion for relief from a judgment or 
order may be granted by a court to provide relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
under certain circumstances, including but not limited to the discovery of new evidence, or 
any other reason justifying relief. U.R.C.P. 60(b) (1997). 
6. With respect to Defendant's claim that this Court failed to properly advise 
according to U.R.Cr.P. 11(g)(2), this Court finds that this rule provides the following: 
If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
This Court agrees that, in accordance with the decision State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987), courts are required to strictly comply with the provisions of Rule 11, and that 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 631 
JUDGE J. PHILIP EVES 
The above-captioned matter came before this Court on Defendant's Motion of 
Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence. 
The Defendant moves this Court to reconsider the decision executed August 21, 1997, 
wherein the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion and Order for Appointment of Legal Counsel. 
This Court has reviewed Defendant's motion, as well as the Court's previous decisions on 
similar motions. Having reviewed the file, having reviewed the applicable law, and deeming 
itself fully advised in the premises, the Court now makes the following findings and 
conclusions: 
1. On November 14 1988, the Defendant was convicted of murder pursuant to the 
entry of a guilty plea. What followed thereafter were numerous attempts, both to this Court 
and to the state appellate courts, on the part of the Defendant to have this guilty plea 
withdrawn and have the matter set for trial. In all such instances, this Court denied 
Defendant's motions, which denials were affirmed by the appellate courts. 
2. Following Defendant's July 28, 1997 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
Correct liiegal Sentence, wherein Defendant requested the Court to appoint legal counsel and 
requested that his guilty plea be withdrawn and his sentence be "corrected," this Court issued 
a decision denying Defendant's motion. At that time, this Court held that, though it was 
within its discretion to appoint counsel on a pro bono basis, that Defendant's petition neither 
contained factual allegations necessitating an evidentiary hearing, nor did it involve 
complicated issues of law or fact requiring the assistance of counsel. Therefore, this Court 
declined to appoint legal counsel on Defendant's behalf, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-36-109 
(1996). (Mem. of P. & A., pp. 2-3) This Court further found that Defendant's motion was 
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murder. He was charged with 
another while engaged in the 
commit robbery or aggravated 
§ 76-5-202(1) (d) . The trial 
imprisonment and recommended 
parole or even be considered 
least Twenty (20) years." 
pleaded guilty to first degree 
intentionally causing the death of 
commission of or an attempt to 
robbery. See Utah Cede Ann. 
court sentenced him to life 
that "the Defendant not be allowed 
for parole until he has served at 
On December 4, 1991, Smith moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea on the ground that the trial court could not have reasonably 
accepted a guilty plea for capital murder because Smith had 
denied that he was attempting to rob the victim at the time of 
the murder. On February 24, 1992, the trial court denied the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Smith filed a notice of 
appeal'from that ruling on March 20, 1992. Subsequently, on 
December 4, 1992, Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in this Court, alleging that he had received ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the sentencing proceeding. On 
January 5, 1993, this Court referred the habeas petition to the 
Third District Court, where it is currently pending. 
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Counsel was appointed to represent Smith on his appeal 
from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Counsel states in his brief for defendant: 
After review of the record appellate counsel 
concluded that the lower court was absolutely 
correct in its ruling. Since Mr. Miller [a 
co-defendant] was purportedly ready to 
testify as to the intention of robbing the 
victim there is no question but that a jury 
could have believed Millers testimony and 
[could] have found Defendant guilty of 
capital murder. The argument that Defendant 
made to the .Tower court was simply without 
merit. 
Initially, counsel considered filing an 
Anders brief allowing Defendant to argue his 
position in spite of counsel's belief to the 
contrary. Appellate counsel has spoken [at] 
length with Defendant at the Utah State 
Prison and is now able to represent that 
Defendant concurs in this assessment and 
therefore withdraws any appeal based upon the 
grounds previously raised below. 
Counsel further states that under State v. Clavton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), and State v. Gabaldon# 735 P.2d 410 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987), an attorney representing a criminal defendant on 
appeal may withdraw only if he finds the case to be wholly 
frivolous but that "the present situation is somewhat of a 
hybrid. The grounds raised by the defendant are clearly 
frivolous and cannot be supported. On the other hand, grounds 
that were not raised by the defendant below are, in the opinion 
of counsel, meritorious and deserve consideration by some 
reviewing court.1' We agree that other evidence of Smith's intent 
to rob existed and that tne trial court properly denied the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
The issue that appellate counsel urges us to address 
for the first time on appeal is whether the trial court erred in 
entering a twenty-year recommendation of incarceration with 
respect to Smith's prison sentence. Counsel asserts that there 
was no factual record before the trial court justifying that 
recommendation. We refuse to address the issue. 
It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not 
address issues raised for the first time on appeal except in 
extraordinary circumstances that do not exist here. Oner Int'l, 
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1992); State v. Stecrcrell, 660 P.2d 
252, 254 (Utah 1983). However, the district court may address 
No. 920141 2 
the issue of the twenty-year recommendation in Smith's pending 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, 
Richard C. Howe, 
Chief Justice 
Christine 
Chie f Justice 
Associate 
M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
The issue that appellate counsel urges us to address 
for the first time on appeal is whether the trial court erred in 
entering a twenty-year recommendation of incarceration with 
respect to Smith's prison sentence. Counsel asserts that there 
was no factual record before the trial court justifying that 
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The above-captioned matter came before this Court on Defendant's Motion of 
Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence. 
The Defendant moves this Court to reconsider the decision executed August 21, 1997, 
wherein the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion and Order for Appointment of Legal Counsel. 
This Court has reviewed Defendant's motion, as well as the Court's previous decisions on 
similar motions. Having reviewed the file, having reviewed the applicable law, and deeming 
itself fully advised in the premises, the Court now makes the following findings and 
conclusions: 
1. On November 14 1988, the Defendant was convicted of murder pursuant to the 
entry of a guilty plea. What followed thereafter were numerous attempts, both to this Court 
and to the state appellate courts, on the part of the Defendant to have this guilty plea 
withdrawn and have the matter set for trial. In all such instances, this Court denied 
Defendant's motions, which denials were affirmed by the appellate courts. 
2. Following Defendant's July 28, 1997 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
Correct liiegal Sentence, wherein Defendant requested the Court to appoint legal counsel and 
requested that his guilty plea be withdrawn and his sentence be "corrected," this Court issued 
a decision denying Defendant's motion. At that time, this Court held that, though it was 
within its discretion to appoint counsel on a pro bono basis, that Defendant's petition neither 
contained factual allegations necessitating an evidentiary hearing, nor did it involve 
complicated issues of law or fact requiring the assistance of counsel. Therefore, this Court 
declined to appoint legal counsel on Defendant's behalf, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-36-109 
(1996). (Mem. of P. & A., pp. 2-3) This Court further found that Defendant's motion was 
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not timely, in that the applicable statute of limitations period had expired for bringing forward 
such motions. (Id. at p. 3) 
3. Defendant claimed he was not advised that the recommendations made by the 
prosecutor and defense counsel were not binding on the Court, and that such knowledge 
would have altered the outcome. This Court declined to grant Defendant's motion on this 
claim on grounds that the Defendant failed to present new evidence, and that the statute of 
limitations period had expired for that relief as well. (Id. at pp. 3-4) 
4. Defendant's present motion requests a reconsideration of that prior order. 
The Defendant primarily focuses on two different claims. First, the Defendant claims that he 
was inadequately represented by counsel at the time the plea agreement was entered on the 
record, in that the State would be unable to establish that Defendant had the requisite intent to 
commit the crime in a trial on the matter, which defense counsel failed to properly consider. 
Second, the Defendant claims that this Court committed error in failing to advise the 
Defendant that any sentencing recommendations agreed upon by the prosecution and defense 
counsel were not binding on the Court. 
5. As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that the rules of civil procedure do not 
include a provision for motions for reconsideration. See Ron Shepherd Ins.. Inc. v. Shields. 
882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994). However, it has been the practice of some courts to address 
motions which have been so titled as if they had been filed pursuant to an applicable rule. See 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). This Court finds that 
Defendant's motion finds some applicability with Rule 60 of the rules of civil procedure, 
which provides for relief from a judgment or order. A motion for relief from a judgment or 
order may be granted by a court to provide relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
under certain circumstances, including but not limited to the discovery of new evidence, or 
any other reason justifying relief. U.R.C.P. 60(b) (1997). 
6. With respect to Defendant's claim that this Court failed to properly advise 
according to U.R.Cr.P. 11(g)(2), this Court finds that this rule provides the following: 
If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
This Court agrees that, in accordance with the decision State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987), courts are required to strictly comply with the provisions of Rule 11, and that 
p 
I appreciate your attention in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Craig S. Cook 
CSC:kd 
cc: Angela F. Miklos 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
the purpose behind this rule is to ensure defendants are guaranteed their constitutional rights. 
7. However, this Court would also point out that the provision at issue affords 
protection only if sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court. In the case at hand, 
the Defendant was charged with a capital offense, the criminal penalties for which are 
statutorily designated as either the death penalty or life imprisonment. U.C.A. § 76-3-207(4), 
(6) (1996). In addition, the parties had entered into a conditional plea agreement which 
expressly provided that Defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than face 
the potentiality of a death sentence in a trial by jury. Therefore, according to the statute, and 
the plea arrangement agreed to by the parties, the term of Defendant's sentence was not an 
issue at the time of sentencing. 
8. At the time the Defendant entered his plea, this Court asked counsel if they had 
any recommendations regarding sentencing. This question, taken out of context, may be what 
has confused the Defendant and led him to believe that some violation of his Rule 11 rights 
was violated. However, when taken in context, the question was asked and responded to in 
light of Defendant's right to delay the imposition of sentencing for a period of thirty days. 
Counsel for the Defendant responded by saying that the Defendant desired to waive that time, 
and that a presentence report was unnecessary in light of the nature of the plea. Therefore, 
this Court does not find merit in Defendant's claim that the Court erred by violating 
Defendant's Rule 11 protections. 
9. With respect to Defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at the time he entered his plea, this Court agrees with Defendant's interpretation of 
U.C.A. § 78-35a-106(2), insofar as the statute permits individuals challenging a conviction or 
sentence to seek relief on grounds they received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that this 
claim is exempt from the statute of limitations period governing appeals. However,! this 
Court would add that, in order to establish that he was poorly represented, the Defendant 
must satisfy a two-prong test: 
First, a petitioner must show "that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment." . . .Second, a petition must show that his 
counsel's performance prejudiced him. 
Tavlor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995); quoting Bundv v. Deland. 763 P.2d 803, 
805 (Utah 1988). 
conclusions which had in fact been executed. The Court stated, 
"The Findings entered may remain with these adjustments." 
On December 27, 1993 the Supreme Court in Case No. 92-0141 
affirmed the lower court's denial of Mr. Smith's Motion to 
Withdraw his guilty plea and discussed the issue that was raised 
for the first time on appeal concerning Appellant's claim that 
the lower court had insufficient evidence in order to make a 
twenty year recommendation of a sentence. Because this issue was 
raised for the first time on appeal, the Supreme Court refused to 
hear it. The Court stated, "However, the District Court may 
address the issue of the twenty-year recommendation in Smith's 
pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." 
These procedural events, as seems to be typical of this 
case, cannot be readily classified under our rules of civil 
procedure. I view them as follows: The state submitted proposed 
Findings to the Court which had not been approved as to form by 
myself. Through a misunderstanding I assumed that my objections 
had been filed concurrently but apparently they were not. This 
Court, based upon no objections, entered the Findings on November 
22. 
No official notice was sent to me that the Judgment had been 
entered in accordance with Rule 58A(d). Nevertheless, I sent to 
this Court my proposed changes and additions to the Findings 
submitted by the State. This letter and proposed Findings was 
essentially a motion under Rule 52 or Rule 59 requesting an 
amendment of the Findings and Judgment. 
The Minute Entry of December 14, in my view, was therefore a 
decision denying the requested changes except for two specific 
Findings. The Minute Entry, however, is not a final order for 
any purpose and thus an order needs to be prepared officially 
amending the previously-entered Findings. 
Since a final judgment has not been entered in this case 
Rule 59 would allow Petitioner to file a Motion to Open the 
Judgment to take additional evidence, if necessary, as to the 
issue that has been referred to this Court by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
After this Court enters a decision as to the "judge's 
recommendation issue", then the entire matter could be finalized 
if an order which then could be appealable to the Supreme Court 
in Petitioner desires. 
While I acknowledge that this above scenario is open to 
debate, I believe that this is the precise reason that a 
conference should be held in order to discuss the most prudent 
way of proceeding to avoid any further road blocks to completing 
this case. I would be most happy to schedule a conference with 
the Court and with Ms. Micklos at any time during the next four 
weeks. 
10. The burden of satisfying the first prong weighs heavily against the Defendant. 
"To prevail on the first prong, a petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance." 14. (citations omitted). This requires the Defendant to 
demonstrate specific instances where counsel acted or failed to act in a manner which does 
not meet an objective standard of reasonableness. Id- (citations omitted). Importantly, courts 
reviewing an attorney's performance will grant "counsel wide latitude to make tactical 
decisions and will not question such decisions unless . . . [there is] !no reasonable basis' for 
them." &., quoting Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993). 
11. In the present case, defense counsel addressed the Court with regard to the 
weaknesses in the State's case against the Defendant. At that time, defense counsel stated 
that, in light of the fact that Defendant's co-defendant was involved in a criminal case arising 
out of the same incident, and that testimony might be elicited in that case which would 
implicate the Defendant in a robbery offense, it was advisable for the Defendant to accept the 
terms of the plea. When taking the co-defendant's criminal case into consideration, and the 
possibility that Defendant faced a death sentence if his case had resulted in a jury trial, it is 
the opinion of this Court that defense counsel's advice that Defendant sign the plea agreement 
had a reasonable basis which does not reflect ineffective assistance of counsel. 
12. As this Court has determined Defendant failed to satisfy the first prong required 
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it will not reach the issue of whether Defendant 
satisfied the second prong. Therefore, this Court finds that the Defendant has failed to set 
forth any new facts or present any other reason which would warrant providing relief from 
this Court's August 21, 1997 decision. 
13. In conclusion, this Court would direct Defendant's attention to the Court's 
finding in the August 21, 1997 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, wherein the Court 
determined that Defendant's motion was frivolous, repetitive and without merit pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. 65(B)(5). This Court would also direct Defendant's attention to the case Wright v. 
Carver. 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994), which held: 
"A ground for relief from a conviction or sentence that has once been fully and 
fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas proceeding should not be 
readjudicated unless it can be shown that there are 'unusual circumstances.' . . .This 
rule was fashioned to prevent abuse by prisoners who burden the courts and 
frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep cases alive indefinitely,'" 
January 13, 1994 
Honorable David S. Young 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Tracy Eugene Smith v. Hank Galetka, et al. 
Case No. 93-0900217HC 
Dear Judge Young: 
I have recently completed an extensive review of this case 
together with the decision rendered last month by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, because of various procedural 
difficulties which have occurred in this case, I am at a loss as 
to how to proceed. For this reason, I would request a conference 
with counsel in order to have the opportunity to determine how to 
proceed in the future. 
In order to allow the Court and counsel an insight into my 
concerns I offer the following. At the conclusion of the hearing 
in this case you ordered that Ms. Micklos prepare Findings in 
support of your judgment. I was to be sent the Findings for my 
approval as to form. Accordingly, Ms. Micklos sent me her 
proposed Findings and in order to try to expedite this case T 
sent to her my proposed changes to her Findings and Conclusions 
on November 3, 1993. On November 9 she sent me a letter stating 
she could not accept these changes and that the Findings would 
therefore be submitted to. 
I assumed that my objections were also included with her 
Findings but I do not know if they were or not. In any event, on 
November 22 the Court executed the Findings and Judgment. On 
November 29 I sent this Court a letter stating that I was not 
sure if my objections had been received and therefore enclosed a 
copy of my objections for consideration. At that time I did not 
know that the Court had already executed the Findings and Order. 
On December 14 this Court issued a Minute Entry declining to 
sing the requested Findings offered by me but finding that the 
Court disagreed with portions of two of the findings and 
Id., quoting Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989). This Court finds that the 
present motion merely recited those arguments made by Defendant on other occasions, and 
represents an attempt to keep his case alive indefinitely. As such, it was within this Court's 
discretion to dismiss the present motion without including findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. 
14. Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion of Reconsideration of Defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence is DENIED. 
Dated at Parowan, Utah this 2bi_T day of September, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
S. 
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to weigh probabilities and "what ifs" then an evidentiary hearing 
should be held so that factual findings can be made concerning 
these predictions and probability assessments. Petitioner would 
assert, however that the record on its face clearly shows that 
he was denied effective representation of counsel by the complete 
failure to meet the standards of an attorney representing a 
defendant in a capital murder case in which a substantial 
sentence is extremely possible. 
For these reasons, therefore, this matter should be set for 
hearing either on the merits or remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing to answer any of the questions that are pertinent to this 
petition. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 1992. 
Craig S. C6fok 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
this 28th day of December, 1992. 
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JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i 
STATE OF UTAH, j MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 631 
This matter came before the Court this date on the petitioner's Motion and Order for 
Appointment of Legal Counsel. The petitioner moves the Court for appointment of legal 
counsel to be paid by Beaver County and to pursue petitioner's most recent motion to 
withdraw his plea. 
The defendant was convicted of murder upon his plea of guilty on November 14, 1988. 
Thereafter in December 1991, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after 
having lost his direct appeal rights by inaction. The Court denied the request to withdraw the 
guilty plea and the matter was pursued by appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
On December 27, 1993, the Supreme Court issued its opinion addressing the claims raised by 
the defendant, including the letter written by this Court to the Board of Pardons recommending 
that the defendant serve at least 20 years. The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw 
the plea was upheld. Thereafter the defendant herein filed a motion for an order of the Court 
correcting the sentence which Mr. Smith claimed was illegal. The Court issued a 
Memorandum Opinion on July 19, 1996, in which the defendant's motion was denied. That 
which occurred or could have occurred because of counsel's 
conduct during the sentencing proceedings- See Petitioner's 
Memorandum at 10-16. 
The State wishes Petitioner to be a fortune teller. The 
State wishes Petitioner to allege what the judge woud have done 
had Petitioner's attorney presented the information to him as he 
should have done under an effective counsel standard. Petitioner 
submits that there is a reasonable probability that the conduct 
of his counsel undermined the confidence in the outcome of the 
sentencing recommendation. Again, Petitioner was entitled to 
present reliable information to the court as part of his 
constitutional sentencing rights. Whether the judge would have 
done anything differently after this material had been presented 
is not the question. It is the failure to present this material 
which is the crux of this petition. In the context of a trial 
setting, it cannot be said that the complete failure of Mr. 
Shumate to present any evidence or arguments in the sentencing 
hearing was "harmless error." 
The State also wishes Petitioner to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the twenty-year recommendation made by the 
court conclusively caused the twenty-year sentence imposed by the 
Board of Pardons. This kind of proof is not required here. The 
mere coincidence of the twenty-year term in both proceedings 
establishes a "reasonable probability" that the judge's 
recommendation was followed by the Board of Pardons. 
The State, in summary, is attempting to use technicalities 
to escape a clear case of possible injustice. If it is necessary 
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determination was appealed. On April 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum 
Opinion upholding the decision of the trial court. 
In addition Mr. Smith filed in the 3rd-District Court the case of Smith v. Galetka. Case 
No. 930900217, which was a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that case Mr. Smith 
raised additional claims as to the propriety of the taking of his plea. The trial court ruled 
against Mr. Smith in that case, and Mr. Smith did not appeal. 
MOTION TO APPOINT T.EOAL COUNSEL 
On July 28, 1997, Mr. Smith filed yet another Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
Correct Illegal Sentence. He now seeks to have this Court appoint counsel to represent him 
and proposes to require the County of Beaver to pay the costs of that Motion and the 
subsequent proceedings. 
Under the provisions of 78-35a-101 UCA, et. Seq.. the Court has authority only to 
appoint pro bono counsel. There is no provision for appointments paid by the county where 
the conviction occurred. 
This Court apparently has discretion as to whether or not to appoint counsel. (See 78-
35a-109 UCA) Although this is a serious case for the petitioner in view of the long period of 
confinement which he is undergoing, the Court is of the opinion that Mr. Smith has had 
several opportunities to raise the issues which he thought were appropriate relating to his entry 
of his plea of guilty in this case. The Court can see no reason to appoint counsel in this case 
and hereby declines to do so. 
The Lockhart case acknowledged that in many instances an 
inquiry of "prejudice11 will depend on likelihoods of various 
circumstances and how they would have most probably affected the 
outcome of a trial or plea. Petitioner was entitled to be 
informed of all available pertinent information concerning 
sentencing. By not being given this information he was clearly 
prejudiced as a matter of law by being unable to make a knowing 
and voluntary decision. If he stated today that he would not 
have entered the plea had he known this twenty-year 
recommendation would be made, such a statement would be 
meaningless since the inquiry in these type of cases is at the 
time the guilty plea was made. The failure to correctly advise a 
defendant as to pertinent sentencing information creates 
automatic prejudice regardless of what outcome a defendant may 
have chosen had he been correctly advised. 
The second portion of the argument made by the State is 
equally absurd. The State claims that the petition never alleges 
that but for counsel's errors the judge would have made a 
different recommendation or no recommendation at all. 
(Respondents' Brief at 8). This statement is simply not true. 
As noted in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities which was 
incorporated by reference in the habeas corpus petition, "had 
Petitioner's appointed counsel been effective the twenty-year 
recommendation made by the lower court at the conclusion of the 
sentencing proceeding may well not have been made." (Petitioner's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 2). Moreover, Petitioner 
devoted seven pages of his Memorandum to showing the prejudice 
-8-
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Section 78-35a-109 UCA requires the court to consider two factors in deciding whether 
to appoint pro bono counsel. The court has considered those factors. This case raises only 
one issue, ie: whether the defendant can withdraw his plea of guilty. Defendant alleges that 
this court failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 11, U.R.Crim.P. There is no need for 
an evidentiary hearing as the issues can be decided from the transcripts and records of the 
taking of the plea. In addition, in view of the provisions of 78-35a-106 UCA and 78-35a-107 
UCA, this court will be dismissing and denying the Motion because the Statute of Limitations 
period has passed and the claim raised by the defendant in this motion was raised and 
addressed in previous appeal proceedings, or should have been, or was raised and addressed in 
previous post conviction relief proceedings, or should have been. 
The issues do not appear complicated and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. 
Thus the appointment of pro bono counsel is not warranted. 
The petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Legal Counsel is denied. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
On August 4, 1997, Mr. Smith filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for 
Hearing on his most recent motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The Court declines to set the 
matter for oral argument. The Court has read the Motion submitted by Mr. Smith and the 
affidavits included herewith. Mr. Smith challenges the entry of the plea in this case on the 
grounds that he was not advised that the recommendations of the prosecution and his own 
attorney were not binding upon the Court. 
properly advise him as to his eligibility for parole under the 
sentence agreed to in the plea bargain. The Supreme Court held 
that neither Arkansas nor Federal law required that petitioner be 
informed of his parole eligibility date prior to pleading guilty. 
The Court stated: 
We have never held that the United States 
Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant 
with information about parole eligibility in order for 
the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary, and 
indeed such a constitutional requirement would be 
inconsistent with the current rules of procedure 
governing the entry of guilty pleas in the Federal 
court. 47 4 U.S. at 56. 
In the instant case, the information which was omitted by 
Petitioner's counsel was not that of parole but was that of 
sentencing. Numerous cases hold that matters affecting the 
sentence of a defendant allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if all 
elements and facts and circumstances are not fully explained. 
See State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929 (Utah 1989); State v. Copeland, 
765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 
1988); State v. Vasilacopulous, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
Once again, the State has distorted the record by failing to 
complete the quotation cited in Respondents' memorandum. The 
State makes the following assertion: 
• . ' • . • - * - • 
In his affidavit he states under oath, "Had I 
known that the judge was going to make this kind of 
recommendation I don't know whether I would have 
entered this plea or not... (Respondents' Memorandum 
at 7) . 
The State omitted the following subsequent language of that 
sentence, "since the state had very weak evidence concerning the 
attempt to rob Mr. Bray." (Affidavit at 18). 
-7-
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Defendant has had repeated opportunities to raise this issue, including a prior motion to 
withdraw his plea. There is no new evidence alleged by defendant. The limitations period for 
post-conviction relief has passed. (See 78-35a-107 UCA) 
Pursuant to Rule 65B(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this court now finds that this 
motion is frivolous, repetitive and without merit. In addition, it is unsupported by the records 
of the plea. 
Accordingly for the reasons set out above, the Motion is denied. 
DATED this 21st day of August 1997. 
itself. 
In failing to file a direct appeal, Petitioner cannot be 
held accountable for listening to the advice of the 
court-appointed attorney who is now being accused of being 
ineffective. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989). In 
addition, this Court has held that the writ of habeas corpus is a 
flexible protection to protect against the denial of a 
constitutional right in a criminal conviction and that the "good 
cause" requirement is justified for a number of reasons including 
the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction. Hearst 
v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989). 
Accordingly, this petition is not procedurally barred and 
must not be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THIS PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 
UNDER HILL V. LOCKHART. 
The State next argues that under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52 (1985) Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient prejudice to 
allow this matter to proceed. This claim is broken by the State 
into two parts: first, the assertion by Petitioner that his 
counsel failed to inform him as to the twenty-year sentence 
recommendation or that the judge could make such a 
recommendation; and second, the other matters concerning 
counsel's representation during the guilty plea proceeding. 
These parts will now be addressed sequentially. 
The Hill v. Lockhart case, contrary to the State's 
assertion, is not identical "in all material respects to the case 
at bar." In Hill the petitioner claimed his attorney failed to 
-6-
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followed by the Board of Pardons. 
Garrish involved (1) a direct appeal, (2) a full evidentiary 
hearing as to a subsequent motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
(3) an appeal from that denial; (4) three separate habeas corpus 
actions; and (5) an appeal from the denial of the third habeas 
corpus petition. In contrast to this abundance of judicial 
procedure in Garrish, the petitioner in this case did not file 
any direct appeal from his entry of guilty plea based upon the 
advice of his court-appointed attorney, James Shumate. Appearing 
pro se, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea but 
no evidentiary hearing was held. The Court ordered the dismissal 
of the motion based solely upon the record. It was not until the 
proceedings before this Court with Petitioner's new 
court-appointed attorney that the present claims in the direct 
appeal and habeas corpus action have been made. This blemished 
legal process supports the contention of Justice Zimmerman in 
Garrish that counsel should be provided in a thorough post 
conviction proceeding and appeal. 
Clearly, Petitioner was not previously aware of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel in sentencing now being asserted in 
the habeas corpus action filed in this court. The State's 
repeated reference that he was aware of such a claim four years 
earlier is a complete distortion of the record. (Respondents' 
Brief at 4). His earlier statement in his affidavit concerning 
his counsel's failure to investigate the facts of the crime 
certainly does not preclude an ineffectiveness claim being made 
as to his counsel's performance during the guilty plea proceeding 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
CASE NO. 631 
Defendant. 
The defendant, Tracy Eugene Smith, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Murder 
in the First Degree, a capital felony, on November 14, 1988. The Court sentenced him to 
serve a life sentence and recommended to the Board of Pardons that he serve at least 20 
years before being allowed parole. The defendant has since filed at least one appeal and 
several petitions for extraordinary relief. 
On May 15, 1996, the defendant caused to be filed a "Motion for an Order of Court 
Correcting a Sentence that was Imposed in an Illegal Manner." The defendant moves the 
Court to correct or modify the sentence given by deleting the Court's recommendation' that 
the defendant serve 20 years before being paroled. The defendant correctly argues that the 
Court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. (See Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.) 
The alleged illegality raised by the defendant is that the Court sentenced the defendant 
to a life sentence and then made a recommendation pursuant to 77-27-13(5) UCA. The 
defendant argues that the Court acted illegally because that statutory provision, by its own 
terms, applies only to cases where an "indeterminate sentence is imposed." Defendant takes 
Counsel has read the Garrish case several times and has been 
unable to find anywhere in the opinion that a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is considered a prior post-conviction proceeding in 
relation to habeas corpus petitions. Rule 20, for example, of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure only requests a "statement 
indicating whether any other petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
based upon the same or similar grounds has been filed and the 
reason why relief was denied. (Rule 20(c)(3)). 
The issues in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a 
habeas corpus action can be quite distinct. In the motion to 
withdraw action, the question is whether the defendant made a 
knowing plea or whether the State and the Court breached its 
agreement with the defendant. In many cases involving guilty 
plea motions no claim whatsoever is made of ineffectiveness of 
counsel. Likewise, a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel in a 
habeas corpus action may have nothing whatsoever to do with the 
entry of the guilty plea. It is for this reason that two 
post-conviction remedies cannot be used as procedural bars in the 
sense of two successive petitions for habeas corpus. 
The distinction in Garrish and the instant case is 
remarkable. Garrish was convicted of child abuse and was 
ultimately sentenced to a minilmum mandatory term of six years to 
life. During the proceedings he was represented by three 
separate attorneys. Here, Petitioner, who was 21 years old at 
the time of the conviction, was represented by only one attorney 
and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-year 
recommendation of imprisonment. This recommendation is now being 
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the position, citing no authority ^porting his view, that a life sentence is not an 
indeterminate sentence. 
The Court now holds that the position of the defendant is incorrect under the Utah 
sentencing scheme. In fact a life sentence for Murder, a capital felony, is an indeterminate 
sentence. Therefore the sentence is not illegal. 
Under Utah's sentencing scheme, all commitments to prison are considered 
indeterminate sentences unless otherwise provided by law. (77-18-4 UCA) Utah's 
Constitution and statutes provide for a Board of Pardons which body is charged with the 
authority and responsibility oi delinking whether a sentence will be fully served, modified, 
or terminated. (See 77-27-5 UCA; Andrus v. Turner. 590 P.2d 363; Raslins v. Holden. 869 
P-2d 958.) 
The Board of Pardons has unfettered discretion in carrying out its function and its 
decisions are not subject to judicial scrutiny, except in limited cases. 
An indeterminate sentence is one fixed by the sentencing authority (the Court) as a 
maximum sentence or within a possible minimum/maximum range, understanding that the 
actual time to be serve will be later determined by another entity, the Board of Pardons.1 
The alternative plan, determinate sentencing, is used in some states and jurisdictions. Under 
determinate sentencing the Court fixes the exact number of years, months or days to be 
served by the defendant and no other entity has authority to require more or less, as long as 
the sentence is legally permissible. This is not Utah's approach to sentencing. 
*See Mutart v. Pratt. 170 P.67; State v. Empev. 239 P.25; Lee Lim v. Davis. 284 
P.232. 
Minute Entry substantiates Petitioner's claim by the following 
statement: 
This matter was called on for hearing at the 
request of the defendant, Mr, Shumate informed and 
the defendant concurred that the motion be voluntarily 
withdrawn. Mr. Shumate stated that the defendant will 
pursue his requested relief in the Federal court 
system. The appeal was ordered withdrawn. (R. 86). 
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed on December 
4, 1991 by the petitioner pro se. His sole grounds for the 
petition was that there was insufficient evidence to charge him 
with first degree murder. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS PETITION IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
SINCE PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE BROUGHT 
HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM IN HIS 
PRIOR MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
The State argues that since Petitioner did not raise the 
ineffectiveness of counsel in his motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea he is now barred from raising it in this habeas corpus 
action. The State cites the case of Garrish v. Barnes as 
standing for the proposition "a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
is a prior post-conviction proceeding for procedural bar 
purposes." Again, the State completely distorts the status of 
Utah law. In Garrish this Court held that Garrish was 
procedurally barred by failing to raise the issue of the breached 
plea bargain on appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea. This Court did not hold that the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea precluded a subsequent habeas corpus 
action. 
-3-
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A life sentence for capital murder is an indeterminate sentence modifiable by the 
Board of Pardons. Otherwise the Court's recommendation of 20 years before parole would 
be irrelevant and meaningless and this Motion would never have been made. It is evident 
that the Utah Legislature considers a life sentence for capital murder as an indeterminate 
sentence, since it has enacted, since the sentencing in this case, a new possible sentence in 
such cases, life without possibility of parole. (See 76-3-201 UCA) 
The defendant's Motion is denied. The sentence in his case was not illegal as he 
complains. 
DATED this ? ~day of July 1996. 
important facts. For example, the State makes the following 
quotation: 
Petitioner therein stated that he had been 
assured by his attorney "that a timely notice of 
appeal would be filed with this Court, base[d] upon 
but not limited to effective assistance of counsel." 
(R. 69). (Respondent's Memorandum, at 2). 
Respondents conveniently left out the last sentence that 
Petitioner wrote following that quoted by the respondents. It 
stated, "That counsel did not fully investigate the facts of the 
case at bar that could have proven the defendant's innocence." 
(R. 69). Thus, contrary to the State's repeated assertions, any 
mention of ineffective counsel in this prior motion had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the proceedings of the guilty plea but 
instead concerned a claim that counsel failed to investigate the 
facts of the killing. 
A second serious omission concerns the facts and 
circumstances relating to the "notice of belated appeal." On 
January 27, 1989 the Clerk of this Court sent a notice to the 
Beaver County Clerk that a notice of appeal had been filed in 
Case No. 890027 (R. 74). On March 20, 1989 a hearing was held 
before the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Defendant was once again 
represented by his court-appointed attorney, James L. Shumate. 
If the question of this appeal becomes relevant, Petitioner would 
proffer that in his conversations with Mr. Shumate he was 
informed that he could not raise any claim of ineffectiveness of 
counsel on appeal and that therefore he should go into the 
Federal court and file a habeas corpus action if he was unhappy 
with Mr. Shumate's performance concerning the investigation. The 
-2-
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CRAIG S. COOKr No. 713 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: 48 5-8123 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
Petitioner, TO RESPONDENTS1 MOTION 
TO DISMISS HABEAS PETITIC 
vs. 
HANK GALETKA, North Point Warden, No. 920553 
UTAH STATE PRISON and THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
This Memorandum is written in opposition to Respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on 
December 18, 1992. 
The State has distorted the factual record in this case as 
well as applicable case law, and has failed to correctly analyze 
the facts and legal principles as they apply to this case. For 
these ireasons, therefore, Petitioner is compelled to respond to 
its Memorandum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State attempts to argue that Petitioner in December of 
1988 had the opportunity of filing a direct appeal in this matter 
and did not do so. The State has left out, however, several 
-1-
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LEO G. KANELL 
Beaver County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 471 
Beaverr Utah 84713 
Telephone: 438-2351 
[Jfi\/ i ." 1 0 0 0 
•A 
Clert 
Depute 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN, 
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL, 
AND ORDER 
Criminal No, 631 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA AGREEMENT 
I, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, the above-named Defendant, under 
oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of guilty to 
the charge of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a capital offense, as 
contained in the Information on file against me in the 
above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have received, and I 
understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is 
a capital felony and that I am entering such plea voluntarily and 
of my own free will after conferring with my attorney, JAMES L. 
SHUMATE, and with the knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
4rmcj4"?£'J7 J£ • 
1. I know that I have constitutional rights under the 
Constitutions of Utah and the United States to plead not guilty 
and to have a jury trial upon the charges to which I have entered 
a plea of guilty or to a trial by the Court should I elect to 
waive a trial by jury. I know that I have a right to be 
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by JAMES 
L. SHUMATE as my attorney, 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial upon the 
charges, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against 
me by having them testify, in open court, in my presence and 
before the Court and jury and that I have the right to have those 
witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have 
the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State, at its 
expense, to testify in Court upon my behalf and that I could, if 
I elected to do so, testify in Court upon my own behalf and that, 
if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this 
fact may not be held against me if I choose to have the jury so 
instructed. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial, the State 
must prove each and every element of the crime charged to the 
satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that 
I would have no obligation to offer any evidence myself and that 
any verdict rendered by a jury, whether it be that of guilty or 
not guilty, must be by unanimous agreement of all jurors. 
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1 C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 | STATE OF UTAH ) 
} 33. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
41 I. PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Notary 
51 Public, in and for the County of Washington, State of 
6| Utah, do hereby certify: 
7| That, the foregoing matter, to wit, 
STATE OF UTAH VS. TRACY EUGENE SMITH, CRIMINAL NO. 621, 
0| was taken down by ma in shorthand at the time and place 
10 therein named and thereafter reduced to computerized 
11 transcription under my direction. 
12 I further testify that I am not interested 
12 in the event cf the action. 
14 WITNESS my hand and seal this 22rd day of 
15 J December, 1988 
16 
17 
18 
191 PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
!C 
21J RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-91 
< ^ . 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
P. C. 3o:c 1524 - St. Gecrge, Ut. (SOI) 673-5215 
4. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of 
the United States I have a right against self-incrimination or a 
right- not to give evidence against myself and that this means 
that I cannot be compelled to testify in Court upon trial unless 
I choose to do so. 
r4 O 5. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Court, I would have 
a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to either the Court 
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for 
such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State without cost 
to me and that I would have the right to have the assistance of 
counsel on such appeal. 
/R^ 6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of 
guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights as set out in the 
five preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully 
incriminating myself by admitting that I am guilty of the crimes 
to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
. H ^ 7. I know that under the laws of Utah the maximum 
sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to 
the charges identified on page one of this affidavit is: 
A. Death or life imprisonment, 
and that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my 
plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of 
-3-
6 
7 
S 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 T 
IS 
10 
20 
21 
MR. SMITH: Yas. sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Good luck. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the 
ibcve-entitled matter were concluded.) 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR, RPR 
which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences 
being imposed on me. 
rtS 8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of 
guilty does not mean that the Court will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been 
made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead 
guilty or that it will be made lighter because of my guilty plea, 
9. No one has forced or threatened or coerced me to 
obtain my plea of guilty and I am doing so of my own free will 
and after discussing it with my attorney. I know that any 
opinions he may have expressed to me as to what he believes the 
Court may do are not binding upon the Court. 
riS 10. No promises of any kind have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty except that I have been told that if I do 
^}N> plead guilty, the State has agreed to not request the death 
* ^  penalty and to not present any aggravating evidence at the 
hearing before the court. I have also been informed that my plea 
of guilty to the offense of FIRST DEGREE MURDER, a capital 
offense, is conditional upon the court's imposition of a sentence 
of life imprisonment. I understand that should the court impose 
the death penalty, I may withdraw my plea of guilty and require 
the State of Utah to go forward with a trial in the matter. I am 
also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a 
-4-
THE COURT: Mr. Kanell, will you prepare the 
commitment papers and the judgment? 
MR. KANELL; Would you like — would it be 
appropriate to indica-e in the order that a firearm was 
used in the commission of the offense? 
THE COURT: Well, there hasn't been a plea taken 
to that, but I think the factual basis, as we stated 
it, is clear. 
Perhaps what I would prefer you do is 
obtain a copy cf the transcript of today's proceedings, 
and ycu may attach that, if you wish, when we send it 
up to the board of pardons. 
MR. KANELL: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else to be 
taken care of? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Good luck, Mr. Smith. 
I need to inform you cf one other matter, 
Mr. Smith. You have the right to appeal the decisions 
Gi> v.n^Ls wCur%» wCvkQy• Tnaw rxgxiw s.c appea^. cag^ Lns to 
run today. If you want to appeal, you have to file 
notice of your intent to appeal with the clerk within 
20 days of today's date. If you fail to do that, ycu 
lose your right to appeal. 
Do ycu understand your right to appeal? 
""" PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
P. C. Box 1524 - St. George, Ut. (801) 672-5215 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court 
and may or may not be approved or followed by the Court. 
11. I am not now under the influence of either drugs 
or alcohol. 
/^(*S 12. I have read this Statement or I have had it read 
to me by my attorney and I have placed my initials beside each 
paragraph to indicated that I know and understand its contents. 
I am JIJ/ years of age, have attended school through 
the \D~~ and I can read and understand the 
English Language. I have discussed its contents with my attorney 
and I ask the Court to accept my plea of guilty to the charges 
set forth above in this statement because I did, in fact, 
(1) on the 3rd day of October, 1988, intentionally and 
knowlingly caused the death of JAMES GLEN BRAY, while 
engaged in the commission of an attempted, aggravated 
robbery; 
(2) That I did so within Beaver County, State of 
Utah. 
DATED 
:an. 
this / V ^ d a y of Afov&i* ktl* 1988. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH 
Defendant 
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THE COURT: Mr, Kane11, anything? 
MR.. KANELL: Your Honor, pursuant to the plea 
agreement, the State does not have any evidence of 
aggravating circumstances to present, and the State 
does not request the Court to sentence the defendant to 
the death sentence, 
THE COURT: Does not request that? 
MR. KANELL: Does not request that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KANELL: The State requests the Court to 
sentence the defendant to life in prison, 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SHUMATE: I'll submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Tracy Eugene Smith, 
having been convicted by your own plea of the offense 
of murder in the first-degree, a capital offense, in 
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, I now 
sentence you to the Utah State Prison for the rest of 
your natural life. 
I'm also going to make a recommendation to 
the board of pardons, which I would like included in 
the order, that Mr. Smith serve 20 years before he's 
considered to be released from the Utah State Prison. 
Anything else? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honcr. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for TRACY EUGENE 
SMITH, the Defendant above-named, and I know the Defendant has 
read the Affidavit or that I have read it to the Defendant; I 
have discussed it with the Defendant and believe that the 
Defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the 
foregoing Statement are, in all respects, accurate and true. 
DATED this f C/ day of /]/£,,<^ Atf*~ / 1988. 
HUMATE* 
ttorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF^/PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah 
in its case against TRACY EUGENE SMITH, Defendant. I have 
reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the 
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct. 
No improper inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a 
plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations 
-6-
right? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You realize than and 
I've already told you that if I sentence you today, 
51 I it's going to be to the state prison for the rest of 
6 / your life. 
71 Do ycu understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And having that in mind, do you 
still wish to waive your right to a delay? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect 
that waiver. 
Does either counsel wish to present 
anything before I impose sentence? 
Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith, do you wish to make a 
statement in your own behalf before I impose sentence? 
MR. SMITH: I'm sorry for what happened. I 
wish, you know, if he could feel my apology. I knew 
that it can't bring him back, but I didn't mean to do 
it. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SMITH: That's it. 
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PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
P. 0. Bex 1524 - St. Gecrss, Ut. (SOI) 672-521! 
are fully contained in this Statement and in the attached plea 
agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. 
There_ is reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support 
the conviction of the Defendant for the offense (s) for which the 
plea(s) are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest. 
DATED this f^/ti day of V/^<^^\ , 1988. 
LEO G. KANELL 
Beaver County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing 
Statement of Defendant regarding Plea Bargain and the foregoing 
Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that 
the Defendant's pleas of "guilty" to the charge(s) set forth in 
the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered. 
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before 
me this l¥-day of /£rt><^ntyW^, 1988. 
Judge 
88cr49 
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find that this plea is governed by the provisions of 
the Alford-decision — Alford versus North Carolina. 
And I' m going to accept it on both of those bases, and 
I'm going zo order the plea of guilty entered. 
Recommendations regarding sentencing in 
the matter? 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, Mr. Smith would ask 
the Court to allow him to waive the statutory time and 
proceed with sentencing at this time rather than to 
order the preparation of a presentence report, in view 
of the nature of the plea and the c circumstances of the 
facts before the Court. 
I don't think that the Court sentencing 
alternatives are substantial at all, and we're prepared 
to go forward with that at this time. 
THE COURT: All right. Does the State have any 
objection? 
MR. KANELL: The State does not oppose that. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, just so 
you're clear on this, the law allows you two days 
before you're sentenced and up to 30 .days for 
sentencing. And you have the right to take advantage 
of that delay if you wish. 
Your counsel's indicated that you want to 
give up that right and be sentenced today: is \:hat 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
